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Operation Safe Corridor: An Outcome Evaluation

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Abstract

Exposure to crime occurs when an individual's activities place them in vulnerable situations. A collaborative problem-solving approach to address student victimization in one area of the City of Ashton resulted in the development of a safe passageway initiative, Operation Safe Corridor (OSC). OSC applies the logic of crime and place research by focusing efforts that seek to modify behavior and reduce opportunities for criminal behavior in the corridor. Despite concentrated deployment of resources in a relatively small area, OSC has not had the expected impact on student victimization. While OSC was introduced as a measure whose primary focus was to combat personal crimes, particularly street robberies, the intervention appears more successful with respect to property crime. Thus, despite efforts to raise awareness regarding personal safety, college-aged individuals are still making themselves vulnerable as targets and OSC seems to have had more an effect on would-be offenders than potential victims. The program appears to have been successful at hardening a location (the corridor) but was not successful in modifying victim behavior.

Introduction

Operation Safe Corridor is a collaborative effort in crime prevention and community safety in the City of Ashton. Following a series of assaults and robberies in Ashton's Pine Woods area in 2005, the City of Ashton Police Department, the University of Ashton Police, and Ashton College security joined together to design and implement a strategic crime reduction initiative.¹

This report summarizes our statistical analysis of the impact of Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) on monthly trends in recorded Part I crimes, simple assault and criminal mischief. It

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considers the impact of OSC on crime trends in the corridor per se and also in a catchment area immediately surrounding the corridor (see Figure 1). Analyses presented here describe changes in monthly levels of crime (either upward or downward), comparing average monthly counts in the pre-intervention period (January 2000 to August 2005) to average counts in the post intervention period (September 2005 to May 2008), net of other trends and patterns in the time series.

The Area

The corridor consists of streets that are in the heart of a predominantly residential part of Ashton, which includes not only a mix of owner-occupied and rental housing but also a number of college dormitories and other residence halls. The impetus for OSC's formulation was a series of offenses against college students, whose lifestyles tend to include patronage of taverns and other establishments on the north and south sides of the OSC catchment area.

The Intervention

The intervention was designed to maximize pedestrian safety and prevent crime in areas frequently traveled by students and other community members. The OSC strategy encapsulates a number of components including: high visibility patrols in a designated set of streets that comprise the "corridor" (see Figure 1, an area 1.115 miles long); community outreach initiatives; educational awareness (including encouragement to travel by foot in the corridor rather than via other routes); video surveillance; taxi stands; and improved lighting.

Uniformed police details were established to patrol the corridor Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights from 9 pm until 5 am. Crime data analysis indicated that college-age persons were at an increased risk for victimization and crime was temporally concentrated in the corridor during these hours. Typically, OSC details deployed by the Ashton police department are sixty-

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six manhours per week and are filled with one Ashton police sergeant and two to three patrol officers. Blue and orange signs marking the Safe Corridor route are displayed along the entire corridor as a means to increase awareness among both potential victims and would-be offenders, and to encourage pedestrians to travel within the designated area.

Drawing on the crime prevention through environmental design concept, the OSC planning committee conducted environmental surveys at the outset of the project. Representatives from the Ashton Police Department, The University of Ashton Police, and the Ashton College Security Office assessed the corridor during daytime hours and again on a weekend evening when pedestrian traffic would be at its peak. Increased street lighting and proper tree trimming to increase overall lighting efficiency were identified as environmental redesign issues. The lighting issues were forwarded to the power company, though no action has been taken. The City has acted upon the need to trim the trees.

Educational awareness is also a major component of the Safe Corridor intervention. Beginning in the fall of 2006, Safety Fairs are held twice a year at the Alumni Quad, a University of Ashton residential dormitory located within the corridor. At the Safety Fairs, students are given tips on how to enhance their personal safety and how to protect their possessions, and the concept of the Safe Corridor is either introduced or reinforced.

By January of 2007, eight taxi stands were in place in the intervention area for the intended purpose of funneling people into a common area from which to hail taxis. By March 2007, informational brochures about the Safe Corridor initiative were hung on the doors of every residence in the corridor. Rape Aggression Defense (RAD), a self-defense program for women, was offered to college students in March of 2007 under the auspices of OSC, and paid for with grant funds earmarked for OSC activity.

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In the spring of 2007, Operation Safe Corridor partnered with local businesses to further enhance the development of the intervention. Businesses within and around the corridor were asked to display a sign indicating that they are a business in the Safe Corridor and that pedestrians could view their store as a safe haven to enter if in fear of their personal safety. Nearly three years into the initiative, there are eleven Safe Haven businesses that display a blue and orange Safe Corridor sign in their storefront. Additionally, the posting of the signs along store fronts in the corridor serves as reinforcement of the corridor boundaries to encourage pedestrians to travel within the designated areas. A press conference which included prominent politicians, university, and law enforcement officials was held to announce the initiative.

Future advancements of the intervention call for increased street lighting, installation of blue light emergency phones, and increased reliance on public camera surveillance technology throughout the corridor². Figure 1 illustrates the boundaries of the OSC corridor and the catchment area.

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


Figure 1

Figure 1 also illustrates the concentration of college and university dorms and residence halls along the corridor and in the catchment area. In particular, there is a heavy concentration of Ashton College residence halls and student apartments along Avenue M. When traveling to Avenue W the residents of these dwellings likely find it more convenient to walk along Street P not Street O, despite the fact Street O is part of the corridor and Street P is outside the corridor. College students travel north and south to local liquor establishments along Avenue W and Avenue C, and during those trips they are at increased risk of victimization.

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Literature Review

Safe street initiatives such as Operation Safe Corridor are necessary because most people are not effective guardians when it comes to their exposure to crime. Exposure to crime occurs when an individual's activities place them (or their property) in "risky or vulnerable situations at particular times, under particular circumstances, and with particular types of people" (Miethe and Meier, 1994, p. 48 as quoted in Barbaret et al, 2004). There is also evidence that risk of victimization is strongly related to how an individual spends his or her time away from home – those who pursue recreational or social pursuits (particularly at night) are more likely to be victimized (Jensen and Brownfield, 1986; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1990 as cited in Barbaret et al, 2004). Additionally, several scholars have reported a relationship between levels of victimization and the amount of time spent in pubs, bars, and nightclubs. For example, results from the 1998 British Crime Survey revealed that violent victimization was significantly related to spending several nights outside the home in an alcohol-serving establishment (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1998 as cited in Barbaret et al, 2004). Considered in this regard, it is easy to understand why a college student population is particularly vulnerable.

There is very little empirical research on safety initiatives such as such Ashton's Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) and, to the best of our knowledge, none on an intervention that is directly comparable to OSC. Other cities have implemented similar safe travel initiatives in the United States, but researchers have only studied a few of those to determine the effectiveness of the interventions in reducing crime, fear, and victimization. Further, the efficacy of those evaluated was based on perceptions derived from self reports rather than incident data maintained in police record management systems.

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For example, in 1995 Philadelphia officials developed a six-week long pilot program aimed at promoting safe travel to and from schools for middle school students which incorporated programmatic components similar to OSC. An assessment of the intervention delivered unfavorable results. Pre- and post-surveys administered to students revealed that levels of violence and fear within the corridor were unchanged. Further, in both the pre- and post-intervention periods much of the reported victimization was the result of student-on-student incidents that occurred outside the corridor in areas not subject to police intervention (Stokes et al., 1996).

A similar intervention, designed and implemented in Brooklyn, was also intended as a safe corridor for students traveling to and from school. The corridor operates at specified times before and after school and draws on a heightened police presence which is expected to decrease student confrontations. It also relies on the cooperation of shop owners to assist students who may need refuge from violent confrontations. However, limited funding means the police presence in the corridor is not as extensive as desired and, to date, there does not appear to be a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the intervention (Sochet 2001).

Despite the lack of research on safe corridor interventions, there is evidence supporting several of the programmatic components incorporated into Albany's Operation Safe Corridor. Evidence from independent, scientific evaluations suggests that strategically focusing enforcement efforts on the places, people, and conditions associated with crime is effective (Mazerolle, Hurley and Chamlin 2002). OSC applies the logic of crime and place research by focusing efforts that seek to modify behavior and reduce opportunities for criminal behavior in the corridor. Such efforts include, police details, surveillance, educational awareness, and environmental design. A systematic review of studies that tested the effectiveness of crime

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opportunity blocking at places found a significant reduction in crime – 90 percent of the evaluated interventions reported a reduction in crime following the use of opportunity blocking tactics (Eck, 1998) Research also suggests that increased police patrols concentrated in hot spots and during times when criminal activity is most prevalent leads to less crime in those places and during those times (Sherman, 1998).

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a place-based crime prevention strategy believed to be effective in reducing both crime and fear. It includes six crime fighting components-territoriality, surveillance, maintenance, access control, activity support and target hardening (Cozens, Saville and Hillier 2005). Many of these were concepts employed by the previously-mentioned Street Crime Initiative in the development of “safer” walking routes for students. Specific measures adopted in the defined routes include high visibility policing patrols around hotspots, prominent signage to denote the route and environmental changes (improved lighting, etc) to improve safety, and increased availability of night buses for students to discourage walking through robbery hot spots (Tilley et al, 2004). These are also several of the concepts adopted by OSC.

For example, with two cameras currently operating in the corridor, OSC has employed the use of surveillance technology to enhance safety and reduce crime and fear in the corridor. The presence of cameras may reduce crime through a number of different mechanisms. Cameras can be used to identify, prosecute, and convict offenders and it is possible that cameras deter would-be offenders from committing crimes in the coverage areas (Ratcliffe, 2006). Research on camera surveillance yields mixed results, however, as studies suggest that camera surveillance is best suited for small, defined areas and has the greatest impact of property crimes (Ratcliffe 2006; Welsh & Farrington, 2004; Brown, 1995) and reducing disorder (McLean et al, 2008).

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Additionally, a systematic review of the effects of improved street lighting on crime concluded that improved lighting increases public perceptions of safety, leads to greater use of public space, and is effective in reducing crime, especially in high-crime areas (Farrington and Welsh, 2002). Building further on the concepts of CPTED, OSC submitted a request for increased street lighting to capitalize on the corridor's crime reducing effects. Trees along the corridor routes were also trimmed to increase visibility.

As with other place-based crime prevention strategies, we would be properly concerned about the potential for crime displacement. The most pessimistic view is that crime is not prevented but rather relocated, with displacement that is immediate and complete, producing no crime-reduction benefit at all. Displacement is more complicated than that, however. Crime may be *spatially* displaced to areas that do not have increased police presence, *temporally* displaced to times when patrols are less visible or intense, and *tactically* displaced in that one method of committing a crime is substituted for another presumed to be less susceptible to detection (e.g. movement of open air drug markets indoors). Spatial displacement could be delayed and/or incomplete, as offenders adapt to the strategy, and inasmuch as other locations are probably not as conducive to criminal activity, any such displacement yields crime reduction benefits. Moreover, some forms of displacement may be, at the margin, beneficial; tactical displacement of open-air drug markets to covert, more discreet drug markets, for example, may be preferable, in that the latter are associated with fewer public nuisances. One of the most inclusive reviews of the literature on the issue concludes that “displacement is a possible, but not inevitable consequence of crime prevention. Further, if displacement does occur, it will be limited in size and scope” (Hesseling 1995). Moreover, recent research has shown that some place-oriented

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interventions produced not a displacement effect but rather a “diffusion of benefits”: the positive, crime prevention effects of the interventions “spilled over” into surrounding areas.

We hypothesize that strategically focusing enforcement efforts on the places, people, and conditions associated with crime – as OSC does – will result in reductions in crime. OSC applies the logic of crime and place research by focusing efforts that seek to modify behavior and reduce opportunities for criminal behavior in the corridor. We expect, therefore, that crime will be reduced in the corridor itself through the higher levels of police presence for which OSC provides, deterring would-be offenders. In addition, crimes that might have occurred on the streets near the corridor might be prevented by channeling would-be victims into the protected area of the corridor, reducing opportunities for crime; in this way, crime in the catchment area may be reduced by OSC. Further, environmental design improvements may also serve to provide target hardening within the corridor.

Data and Methods

We assessed the effect of OSC on crime through analysis of the Ashton Police Department Record Management System (RMS) data. The APD’s RMS contains information on crimes reported to the police and recorded by officers on incident report forms. We assessed the impacts of OSC details by analyzing monthly counts of incidents of crime from January 2000 through May 2008 to calculate changes in mean levels of crime before and after the introduction of OSC.³ In addition, we analyzed monthly counts of incidents of crime in the pre-intervention period and the post-intervention period, as an interrupted time series (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Jay, Jr., 1980). Monthly counts were calculated for crimes occurring within the OSC corridor proper which is 1.155 miles long (or about 0.00878 sq mi); crimes occurring in a

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catchment area immediately surrounding the corridor, about 0.28 sq mi; and crimes occurring citywide, excluding the corridor and catchment area.⁴ The city of Ashton is 21.8 sq mi. We analyzed the demographics of victims in the corridor, in the catchment area and citywide to address the extent to which college-age people (the target population of the intervention) are travelling in the corridor. We turn to those findings first.

Findings

Victimology

Data available in the RMS does not enable us to accurately determine if victims are college students, but we analyzed the age of victims of Part I crime the distribution depicted in Figure 2 below clearly indicates that in the post-intervention period, most victims of Part I crime in the corridor were college-aged; the median age was twenty-two. The majority were white (67%) and male (60%). The pattern was similar when we looked at victim demographics in the post-intervention period in the catchment area. The distribution in Figure 3 below indicates most were college-aged; the median age was twenty-three. The majority of victims in the catchment area were white (63%) and male (57%). When the victimology was repeated for the same time period citywide, a different pattern emerged. The victims were not as heavily concentrated in the college age range (see Figure 4 below); the median age was thirty-three. Nor were the majority of victims of Part I crime citywide white (48%) or male (50%). We repeated the analysis of victim demographics in the corridor, catchment area, and citywide with Part I violent crime, property crime, and robbery. The picture that emerged was consistent with that presented above for all Part I crime. Victims in the corridor and catchment area were, for the most part, college-age white males, which is a pattern that is not found citywide (refer to Table 1). We would not

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expect that criminal mischief and motor vehicle theft are crimes for which one places oneself at risk and a similar college-age trend was neither expected nor found for these two crimes.

We also examined the residential addresses of victims of Part I crimes that occurred in the corridor and catchment area. Of those victims victimized in the corridor more than one-third also resided in the corridor and about fifteen percent lived in the catchment area; thus, over fifty percent of those victimized in the corridor also reside in either the catchment or corridor. The pattern is similar for those victimized in the catchment area with over 55 percent of victims living in either the corridor or catchment area.⁵ Given the high concentration of student housing in the area, combined with the victim age analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that a large portion of the victims in the corridor and catchment area are college students who live in the area. This provides some confirmation that the OSC program patrols, designed primarily to protect college-aged victims, are spatially concentrated where many students live and travel.

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Age Distribution of victims of Part I crime in the corridor




Figure 2

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Age distributions of victims of Part I crime in the catchment area




Figure 3

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


Figure 4

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Table 1: Median Age of Victim by Area and Crime Type Post-Intervention (September 2005 to May 2008)			
	Corridor	Catchment	Citywide
Part I Crime	22	23	33
Violent Crime	22	22	27
Robbery	22	21	28
Aggravated Assault	23	23	28
Property Crime	22	23	35
Burglary	22	22	35
Larceny	21	23	34
MVT	38	30	38
Simple Assault	22	22	28
Criminal Mischief	26	32	38

Mean Levels of Crime

Figure 5 below illustrates the monthly time series for Part I, Part I violent crime, and Part I property crime in the corridor.⁶ The vertical red line indicates the intervention point or the introduction of OSC and activities it encapsulates in September of 2005. Displayed this way, it is difficult to discern program effects, though it is obvious that generally each offense type fluctuates over time, and one can see clearly that during the time period analyzed, Part I crime as a whole and violent crime in particular reached their highest levels in the post-intervention period.

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


Figure 5

Figure 6 below illustrates the monthly time series of Part I crime overall, Part I violent crime, and Part I property crime in the catchment area. Again, the vertical red line indicates the intervention point. Similar to trends in the corridor itself, the graph of trends in the catchment area depicts ongoing fluctuation in monthly counts and overall Part I crime at its highest level in the post-intervention period.

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


Figure 6

Table 2 presents the difference in the mean level of each crime type before (January 2000 to August 2005) and after (September 2005 to May 2008) the introduction of OSC in the corridor, the surrounding catchment area, and citywide. Analyses presented here describe changes in monthly levels of crime (either upward or downward) comparing average monthly counts in the pre-intervention period (January 2000 to August 2005) to average counts in the post intervention period (September 2005 to May 2008). Time series analysis based on ARIMA models yielded the same conclusions.

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Table 2: Percent Change by Area: Mean Differences in Pre- and Post-intervention Levels of Crime			
	Percent change in average monthly crime in the corridor	Percent change in average monthly crime in the catchment	Percent change in average monthly crime citywide
Part I Crime	-3.3%	-10.9%	-18.58%
Violent Crime	1.9%	24.71%	-15.72%
Robbery	3.03%	39.63%	-14.33%
Aggravated Assault	-3.03%	18.55%	-15.39%
Property crime	-4.90%	-18.57%	-19.23%
Burglary	-23.05%	-25.63%	-26.02%
Larceny	7.0%	-11.64%	-14.73%
MVT	-36.60%	-37.37%	-32.32%
Simple Assault	20.0%	-9.89%	-21.1%
Criminal Mischief	-17.96%	-2.66%	-3.42%

Corridor

In the immediate corridor (see Table 2) all but one crime against person type was higher in the post-intervention period, compared to the pre-intervention period. Part I violent crime overall and robbery increased slightly while simple assault rose by 20.0 percent. Aggravated assault did decline 3.03 percent. The slight rise in violent crime in the corridor occurred at a time when the rest of the city was experiencing declines in the mean monthly level of these crime types. Moreover, the citywide decline in aggravated assault (15.39%) was nearly three times greater than the slight decline in aggravated assault in the corridor (3.03%). Property crime, in the main, was lower in the post-intervention period. The only property crime category that

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increased in the post-intervention period was larceny, despite the fact it declined citywide during the same time period.⁷

Catchment area

In the catchment area (see Table 2) the pattern is similar to that seen in the Corridor: the period following the introduction of OSC generally had higher levels of violent crime and lower levels of property crime. Overall, Part I violent crime experienced a 24.8 percent increase, robbery experienced a 39.6 percent increase, and aggravated assault an 18.6 percent increase between the pre- and post-intervention periods. The magnitude of the increases in the catchment area was greater than those experienced in the corridor. Again, these crimes were declining citywide. The only personal crime that declined in the catchment area was simple assault. Similar to the pattern in the corridor, OSC appears to have had more of an impact on property crimes in the catchment area than on personal crimes. The mean levels of burglary, larceny, and criminal mischief were lower in the post-intervention period compared to the period before OSC began. The magnitude of the decreases in each category of property crime in the catchment area was similar to those experienced citywide. For example, Part I property crime declined by 18.57 percent in the catchment area following the introduction of OSC and by 19.23 percent citywide.

Interrupted Time Series Analysis

Time series analyses enable us to describe more precisely the impact of the OSC intervention expressed as a departure, upward or downward, from the average count of crimes per month for each crime type analyzed, net of detectable patterns in the series. The length of the pre and post-intervention periods in the present study is generally recognized in evaluation

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research as a long enough time frame to provide sufficient statistical reliability to draw reasonable conclusions about intervention effects, though we would caution that the baseline levels of many offense categories are so low that a genuine crime reduction impact might not achieve statistical significance.

We conducted time series analysis to provide a statistical check against the results we find when we looked at changes in mean levels of crime. The times series results do not show any different pattern than those presented above in the discussion of changes in mean levels of crime.

Discussion

Despite concentrated deployment of resources in a relatively small area, OSC has not had the expected impact on student victimization. While OSC was introduced as a measure whose primary focus was to combat personal crimes, particularly street robberies, the intervention appears more successful with respect to property crime.

In the target corridor itself the initiative has had little downward effect on violent crime. However, in the corridor Part I violent crime and robbery, in particular, only rose slightly (1.9% and 3.03%, respectively) after the introduction of OSC while at this same time Part I violent crime increased by an average of 24.71 percent and robbery by 39.63 percent in the catchment area. This, coupled with the fact that burglary, motor vehicle theft and criminal mischief in the corridor were at lower levels in the post intervention period suggests OSC details may deter criminals, though other OSC initiatives (safety fairs and signage) are not impacting the behavior of targets or victims. The initiative seems to address the locational elements of crime in a way it has not successfully addressed the behavioral elements.

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In effect, despite attempts to raise awareness regarding personal safety, college-aged individuals are still making themselves vulnerable as targets. We had hypothesized that the area immediately surrounding the corridor – the catchment area - might enjoy violent crime decreases. That is, would-be victims would funnel into the corridor and the smaller number of targets in the catchment area and target hardening in the corridor would result in a decrease in violent crime in both areas. Rather, it seems college-aged individuals continued to travel and ultimately be victimized in the catchment area. In addition, the marked increase in Part I personal crime in the catchment area and not the adjacent corridor suggests a displacement effect whereby offenders are deterred from criminal behavior in the corridor due to increased police presence and have moved to the catchment area instead.

The pattern in the catchment area is similar to that found in the corridor, though with larger base numbers – driven in part by the larger area analyzed – the changes achieve statistical significance. Again, the introduction of OSC is associated with declines in all property offenses, suggesting a diffusion of benefits effect. Presumably, would-be offenders are deterred in the corridor and are also less likely to offend in an area contiguous to the corridor where police presence is heightened and the risk of apprehension amplified. Violent crime in the catchment area increased after the introduction of OSC suggesting evidence of a displacement effect.

Another explanation for the patterns identified in the present analysis may rest on the educational component of OSC. It may be that in both the corridor and catchment area education campaigns serve to assist people in taking measures to protect their property. Alternatively, findings in this report suggest that education campaigns may not be similarly effective at changing behavior in a way that might protect people from personal victimization. Not all self-protective measures are equally costly, in dollar or lifestyle terms.

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While citywide estimates provide a backdrop against which to compare trends in the corridor and catchment area we note that this should be done with caution. Prior to the start of OSC, the demographics of the corridor were undergoing change. In fact, OSC was developed as a partial reaction to the changing population and the related increase in crime in the area. In the Fall of 2002 a twelve hundred capacity residential dormitory on the University of Ashton main campus (two miles from the corridor and catchment area) opened, which pulled students out of off-campus housing in the corridor and catchment area. The student population was, many believe, replaced with a group that is more criminogenic than the student population. Thus, OSC is attempting to push crime down in an area at the same time other forces might be pushing crime up. The demographic changes in the OSC area were not occurring across the city and so direct comparison of citywide and corridor estimates should be made with some caution.

We might anticipate that planned intervention components including increased camera surveillance may amplify the effects of OSC details and lead to further crime reduction effects. To the extent current safety awareness and education campaigns as currently delivered or targeted are not having the greatest possible effect, we might further anticipate that modifications or additions to outreach and awareness campaigns could lead to crime reduction.

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¹ Ashton, Pine Woods, the University of Ashton and Ashton College are all pseudonyms.

² There were a handful of surveillance cameras maintained by the Ashton College and the University at Ashton prior to the introduction of OSC, but the cameras focused more on dormitory and campus building entrances than on the street.

³ We might suppose that given the nature of the intervention effects would be most pronounced on crimes occurring out of doors and during detail hours. The low base rates did not support analysis on such a limited subset of offenses. Additionally, we did not want to mistake the effect of the intervention on the perpetration of crime with the detection and recording of crime by officers on OSC details. Thus, we separated and analyzed crime reported to police as opposed to crimes reported by the police. In doing so, we found no evidence that findings reported in the text based on aggregated totals are confounded by police proactivity, detection or recording practices during OSC details.

⁴ To generate counts of crimes within corridor proper and in the catchment area, GIS(Geographic Information Systems) and spatial data analysis were employed (e.g. Geocoding crime addresses and extracting cases based on corridor and catchment spatial location files).

⁵ This could actually be an underrepresentation since college students, we are told by APD, often give their parent's address as their residential address and not their dorm or apartment address.

⁶ For their purposes, police characterize crimes in terms of the penal law code that has been violated, but the enumeration of crimes normally follows a classification scheme established by the FBI for the UCR program, which focuses on index crimes, which include [murder](#) and non-negligent [manslaughter](#), [robbery](#), forcible [rape](#), [aggravated assault](#), [burglary](#), [larceny/theft](#), [motor vehicle theft](#), and [arson](#). Index crimes or Part I crime are further distinguished in terms of serious violent offenses and property offenses. Violent Part I encompasses: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Part I property offenses include: burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

⁷ We provide citywide estimates as a point of reference but caution readers that the citywide figures include both high crime and low crime neighborhoods and likely mask discrete trends in different areas. It is unlikely that crime declined uniformly across the city but, rather, declined in some areas and increased in others, and so, trends in the corridor may be similar or even better than those experienced in demographically similar neighborhoods at this same time.